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THE PEOPLE, THE SENATE AND THE
COURT: THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF
THE JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION
SYSTEM
Mark Silverstein*
In January of 1932, following the retirement of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, President Herbert Hoover announced to all concerned that he would seek a moderate Republican to replace
Holmes on the Court. A groundswell of support, however, quickly
developed for Benjamin Cardozo, a Democrat and the respected
Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals. The President nevertheless remained adamant; the appointment of Cardozo would
bring a third New Yorker and a second Jew to the Court. Moreover, Holmes had already achieved almost mythical status as the
voice of progressive and realistic jurisprudence and Hoover had little inclination to appoint a justice sure to follow in the Holmes tradition. The possibility of a Cardozo nomination appeared doomed
until William E. Borah, the powerful Republican Senator from
Idaho, met with Hoover and forcefully championed Cardozo as the
best appointment regardless of residence or religion. Cardozo's
nomination was announced soon thereafter and the nomination
cleared the Senate without dissent or discussion. To the surprise of
no one-including President Hoover-Cardozo quickly joined Justices Brandeis and Stone on the liberal wing of the Court.
To even the most casual observer of the Clarence Thomas proceedings, the often-told story of Cardozo's appointmenti must appear as a wondrous fairy tale of a land far away and a time long ago.
Political savants as well as typical citizens have expressed distaste
for the current system, and the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee has suggested a reexamination of the entire process. None of
the participants have distinguished themselves in the tradition of a
Borah (or a Hoover, for that matter) and there can be little doubt
• Associate Professor of Political Science, Boston University.
I. The full story is recounted in Henry Abraham, Justices and Presidents 201-205 (Oxford U. Press, 2nd ed. 1985).
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that the nominees do not measure up to a Cardozo. Certainly the
entire process has become more contentious.
From 1900 to 1968 only one nominee--John J. Parker in
1930-was rejected by the Senate. The failure of Lyndon Johnson
to secure confirmation for Abe Fortas as Chief Justice in 1968 was
quickly followed by the defeats of Clement Haynesworth and G.
Harrold Carswell. Before the defeat of Judge Bork, President Reagan successfully elevated William Rehnquist to the chief justiceship
but only after factious hearings and despite the fact that the new
chief justice received more negative votes than any successful nominee in the twentieth century. Chief Justice Rehnquist, however,
held this dubious record for only five years; Clarence Thomas easily
shattered it in proceedings that quite literally stunned a nation.
Therefore there is much to compel the conclusion that, for better or
for worse, the nomination system in the last twenty-five years has
undergone substantial changes.
This essay seeks to provide some explanations for these developments and, in so doing, to supply a broader context for considering a good deal of the recent controversy regarding judicial
nominations. The central argument is that the system of confirmation of Supreme Court justices (and, to a lesser degree, lower court
federal judges) is a far more democratic process than was the case
decades ago. Profound changes in the structure of national electoral politics coupled with a general transformation of the United
States Senate and an expansion of judicial power have altered the
nature of the politics of Supreme Court nominations. The tightly
structured, leadership-controlled politics of deference to presidential leadership, which often characterized the nomination process
during much of the twentieth century, no longer predominates. In
its place are extraordinarily visible public proceedings, in which
nominees to the Court are subject to the crucible of modem participatory democracy.
In the years following World War II, the Democratic party
emerged as the dominant political party in the United States. Democrats far outnumbered Republicans and Democratic hegemony appeared secure at both the state and national levels. Even during the
era of the Eisenhower presidency, the assumptions of Roosevelt and
Truman shaped the contours of American politics.2 The overwhelming defeat of Barry Goldwater in the 1964 presidential election served as a stunning reminder of the fate that awaited those
who challenged the fundamental principles of the New and Fair
2. William E. Leuchtenberg, In the Shadow of FDR: From Harry Truman to Ronald
Reagan (Cornell U. Press, 1983).
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Deals. Writing during this period, Samuel Lubell characterized the
Democratic party as the "sun" of the American political solar system while relegating Republicans to an orbiting moon, "shin[ing] in
the reflected radiance of the heat thus generated."J The coalition of
minorities forged by Roosevelt-unionized labor, urban ethnics,
middle class liberals, southern whites and northern blacks-comprised a remarkably broad social basis and formed the governing
regime of post-World War II America.
Although the election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 marked the
close of this period of Democratic dominance, the disintegration of
the Roosevelt coalition had begun decades earlier. The causes of its
demise are many: one of the most prominent was, and continues to
be, race. A coalition anchored by southern whites and northern
blacks contained the seeds of its own destruction. Roosevelt
avoided the inherent contradiction within his own governing coalition by frankly downplaying the issue of civil rights. As the national Democratic party became increasingly dependent on a large
black voter turnout, however, the promotion of civil rights policy
became an important campaign pledge of the party. This produced
a decided backlash. In the 1950s for example, one out often identifiers with the Democratic party was black; during the 1980s, it was
one out offive.4 In 1952, seventy percent of white Southerners considered themselves to be Democrats; by 1984 this percentage had
been cut in half.s Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the championing of civil rights policies designed to link blacks with the Democratic party produced the defection of southern whites. The once
solid Democratic southland is now part of a distant political past; in
1988 George Bush won the states of the old Confederacy with well
over fifty-five percent of the popular vote.
The migration of the civil rights movement from the rural
South to northern cities further exacerbated the exodus of whites
from the Democratic party. During the mid-1960s lower middle
class white ethnics-another crucial component of the New Deal
coalition-deserted the Democratic party, particularly at the national level. In the 1968 presidential campaign, George Wallace
succeeded in drawing substantial support from this group and the
1980 election produced a marked movement of blue collar workers
to the Republican national ticket. Michael Dukakis did manage to
counter this defection in 1988, but only by splitting the blue collar
3. Samuel Lubell, The Future of American Politics 212 (Harper, 1952).
4. See, Robert Weissberg, The Democratic Party and the Conflict over Racial Policy in
Benjamin Ginsberg and Alan Stone, eds., Do Elections Matter? (M.E. Sharpe, 1986).
5. Kenneth Janda, et al, The Challenge of Democracy 281 (Houghton Mifflin Co., 2d
ed. 1989).
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vote with George Bush. 6 Increasingly the ethnic, urban voter has
identified the Democratic party with busing and the redistribution
of benefits to black interests and the result has been a significant
erosion of support from this traditional Democratic constituency.'
Race, of course, was not the sole cause of the decomposition of
the Roosevelt coalition. By the late 1960s, younger voters lacking a
personal attachment to the party of Roosevelt began to replace the
generation with direct exposure to the welfare policies of the New
Deal. 8 Traditional Democratic groups-union members, blue collar workers and Catholics-had undergone substantial changes in
the years since the New Deal era. The Democratic party of Franklin Roosevelt was an association of minorities drawn, for the most
part, from the lower end of the economic spectrum. Over the last
several decades, however, income distinctions between working and
middle class have eroded and union membership has declined. Increasingly Americans have identified themselves as part of the wellto-do middle class and this trend has produced a shrinking pool of
voters who link themselves with the Democratic party.
Responding to these developments, the party has sought a new
direction by focusing attention on the burgeoning American middle
class. A battle for the heart of the Democratic party rapidly developed between old line Democrats with roots in the union halls and
Democratic clubs of the United States and a new generation "who
had earned their political spurs in the civil rights movement and
later in the anti-war movement."9 The balance of power in the
party eventually shifted to the insurgents. Decidedly upper-middle
class and college educated, these men and women achieved extraordinary victories during this era on a broad range of political
issues. Their success in ultimately forcing the withdrawal of troops
from Southeast Asia and subsequent legislation limiting the power
of the executive branch in the conduct of foreign affairs was testimony to their emerging political power. But no less significant is
the fact that most of the legislation in the last twenty years concerning environmental protection, consumer protection, occupational
health and safety, gender discrimination, nuclear energy restrictions
as well as reforms of the Democratic party and Congress are the
6. See New York Times/CBS News Poll in New York Times, Nov. 10, 1988, B6.
7. See e.g. Robert R. Huckfeldt and Carol Kohfed, Race and the Decline of Class in
American Politics (U. of Illinois Press, 1989).
8. See e.g., Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter (Harv. U. Press, 1976).
9. Thomas Byrne Edsall, The New Politics of Inequality 49 (W. W. Norton, 1984)
("The New Politics").
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product of what some have termed "the New Politics movement."JO
The ability of New Politics groups to secure policy objectives is
worthy of attention because these accomplishments took place despite a marked lack of success in national electoral politics.
Although the choice of George McGovern in 1972 as the party's
presidential nominee heralded the emergence of a new force in the
Democratic party, it also revealed the inability of this new wing to
appeal to a broad national electorate. The reforms of the nominating procedures adopted by the Democrats in the early 1970s continue to skew the nominating processes of the party in favor of this
new, elite constituency despite the persistent efforts of party profes-"
sionals to redress the balance. Thus the Democratic party displays
a dual personality as power and control vest in the liberal, elite wing
of the party while electoral success at the national level depends on
the turnout of more conservative low and moderate income
voters. 11
The cleavage within the Democratic party has weighty implications for the selection of federal judges. The Democratic party of
Franklin Roosevelt linked its diverse interests through the politics
of patronage, compromise and vote-trading. The coalition might
endure only if the leadership commanded sufficient resources to satisfy the needs of its constituent parts. Submerging ideological differences beneath pragmatic concern with goods and services
marked the New Deal coalition. An appointment to the federal
bench was a resource that could be measured against other available
benefits. Therefore even the occasional controversial, ideologically
charged appointment could not be permitted to upset the commitment to compromise and negotiation that held the party together.
The developing fissures within the Democratic party, however,
placed this understanding of the governmental process in serious
jeopardy. Thomas Edsall, for example, has chronicled the elite
newcomers' disdain for the politics of vote-trading and their support of the congressional reforms that ultimately pared the ability of
the leadership to cut the deals and compromises that formed the
lifeblood of the old coalition.12 More specifically, to the reformminded wing of the Democratic party a judicial appointment was
not simply another instance of federal patronage. During the 1960s
and 1970s the federal courts expanded the ability of groups and interests to seek redress in the federal court system while simultane10. Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, A Critical Realignment? The New Politics,
the Reconstituted Right, and the 1984 Election in Michael Nelson, ed., The Elections of 1984
(C. Q. Press, 1985).
II. See Edsall, The New Politics Ch. I (cited in note 9).
12. ld. at 46-49.
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ously augmenting the array of remedies available to prevailing
litigants. Groups broadly identified with the New Politics movement have utilized the expanded focus of the federal judiciary to
achieve their policy goals, in effect offsetting electoral defeats with
litigation victories.•3 Nominations to the federal bench, particularly
at the level of the Supreme Court, quickly became the type of no
compromise event that the old coalition had sought so hard to
avoid.
As a result, the ante has dramatically increased in battles over
appointments to the federal bench because a wide range of powerful
interests has focused attention on the staffing of the federal judiciary. Democrats' mastery in counteracting electoral defeats through
judicial decree gave rise to a reaction by components of the Republican coalition. Those Republicans were frustrated by their inability
to turn national electoral success into enactment of legislation that
implemented desired social changes. Although a good deal of the
recent Republican resurgence at the national level may be attributed
to the appeal of "Reaganomics,"•• equally important has been the
party's embrace of "family" values, a decision designed in part to
appreciate the defection from the Democratic party by southern
white Protestants and Catholic urban ethnics in the North. By way
of example, political scientists Martin Shefter and Benjamin Ginsberg have explored how the Republican right to life position helped
"to politically unite, under Republican auspices, two religious
groups that had been bitter opponents through much of American
history."ts Despite significant electoral influence, movement conservatives have been frustrated by a federal judiciary that has removed many important social decisions from legislative and
executive control.
For precisely this reason, many on the religious right were
among the most avid supporters of Judge Bork and the most distraught at his defeat. Mirroring the efforts of many groups within
the Democratic party, leaders of several conservative organizations
have promised increased participation in the nomination process.16
With powerful, antagonistic interests in both parties converging on
the selection of Supreme Court justices in very visible, organized
13. The civil rights establishment, long connected to the Democratic party, has always
considered the staffing of the judiciary to be of prime importance. The point here is that
newer and often more politically powerful groups within the party now share this assessment.
The net result is far greater participation in the confirmation process.
14. Kevin P. Phillips, The Politics of Rich and Poor (Random House, 1990).
15. Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, Politics by Other Means: The Declining lm·
portance of Elections in America 122 (Basic Books, 1990).
16. See e.g. Patrick B. McGuigan and Dawn M. Weyrich, Ninth Justice: The Fight for
Bork (Free Cong. Research and Education Fdn., 1990).
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efforts to control the outcome, one senator described the process as
"the worst kind of sleazy political operation."t7 Similiar hyperbole
on the part of participants is currently the norm in large part because the nomination process is no longer the province of political
and legal insiders. In fact, the disorderly contentious proceedings
that have marked recent confirmations merely reflect the mediadominated, participatory nature of modern American politics.
The shifts in electoral politics that have occurred during the
last three decades mirror changes in the United States Senate over
approximately the same period. Although the explosion of group
representation in Washington over the last forty years is well documented, less appreciated is that citizen groups concerned with
broad quality of life issues have expanded at twice the rate of groups
representing traditional economic interests (farmers, unions, etc.).ts
Moreover, these groups have been particularly successful in developing alliances in the Senate. For the organized interest group, active participation and leadership by a member of the Senate in the
group's activities assure the concerns of the group a place on the
national agenda as well as the attention of Washington policy makers and the media. From the perspective of the individual senator,
championing the concerns of these interests provides the opportunity for leadership in matters of national concern with the resulting
national media attention. National visibility enhances the typical
senate career.19
The attention to personal publicity and leadership outside the
institution of the Senate is a recent development. During the last
twenty-five years, the norms of the U.S. Senate and the behavior of
individual senators have undergone major alterations. The adjustment in the operation of the institution and the style of its membership has had profound, if perhaps unappreciated, consequences for
the Senate's role in the appointment of federal judges.
In 1960, the seminal work on the U.S. Senate described a hierarchical institution, governed by widely shared norms, where influence and power varied directly with seniority within the
institution.2o The committee system governed the Senate of the
1950s. Committees controlled policymaking and, within committees, leaders chosen solely on the basis of seniority dominated the
proceedings. Activity on the floor of the Senate was typically con17. Senator John C. Danforth, quoted in The New York Times, Oct. 9, 1991, A20.
18. Jack Walker, The Origin and Maintenance of Interest Groups in America, 77 Am.
Pol. Sci. Rev. 390-406 (1980).
19. Barbara Sinclair, The Transformation of the US Senate (Johns Hopkins U. Press,
1989) ("Transformation").
20. Donald Matthews, U.S. Senators and Their World (U. North Carolina Press, 1960).
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strained; the norm of civility and respect for the expertise of committees precluded floor amendments and restricted important
decisionmaking from the floor of the Senate. Hence policymaking
in the Senate of the 1950s took place in the highly structured confines of the committee system and leadership rested with a handful
of senior senators. Virtually unchallenged was the norm of specialization. Senators were admonished to develop expertise within a
narrow sphere of specialization and to reciprocate by respecting the
expertise of others. A high value was placed on courtesy and reciprocity; senators were expected to avoid personal attacks and to
help colleagues when possible without undue regard for partisanship. Indeed, as Professor Matthews noted, the highly structured
"folkways" of the Senate precluded senators from exercising the extraordinary powers of individual members under the Senate's rules;
to do so, and thus to obstruct the operation of the institution, would
be to violate the unwritten rules of the game and invite not cooperation but retaliation from one's peers.21
Within this highly structured world, newcomers were expected
to serve an apprenticeship. A freshman senator likened his status to
that of a child, to " 'be seen and not heard.' "22 His committee assignments were often those that senior senators found unattractive.
Without exception, younger members were expected to play a subservient role to more established colleagues. In the Senate of the
1950s, the young senator inevitably lacked the resources to become
a force within the institution; both the formal rules and the norms
of the membership sustained the power of senior members.
Observers characterized the Senate of this era as a "small
town" where one got along by going along. Because many committee assignments reflected the reelection needs of individual senators,
the focus on specialization did not necessarily impede a senate career. Abiding by the norms of the institution promised even a newcomer the aid, if needed, of his elder colleagues in a reelection
battle. Furthermore, even the most junior senator might be beguiled by the prospect of someday assuming a leadership position.
Without question the widely accepted norms of the Senate of the
1950s did confine behavior, but the advantages of acceding to the
constraints also typically outweighed those of being a maverick.
The centralized leadership and hierarchical structure of the
Senate help in explaining the extraordinary success rate of presidents from 1900 through much of the 1960s in obtaining Senate
confirmation of Supreme Court nominees. Apart from the rejection
21.
22.

ld. at Ch. V.
ld. at 93.
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of Judge Parker in 1930, the Senate confirmed every Supreme Court
nominee during that period. In the nineteenth century, the Senate
rejected one of every three presidential nominations to the Court.
The Senate of that era, however, was a far more partisan institution.
With senators appointed by state legislatures-the seventeenth
amendment was ratified in 1913-powerful state party leaders often
dominated the Senate and used their power to funnel patronage to
local party organizations. The typical senator of the nineteenth
century had a secure local power base and little tolerance for centralized leadership within the institution. As a result, simple partisan opposition to the nominating president explained many of the
negative votes during the nineteenth century.23 Furthermore, in
such a highly partisan age in which many senators were the leaders
of local political organizations, the unwritten rule of senatorial
courtesy (which required the names of federal appointees to be referred to the senators from the states in which the appointees resided and gave those senators, particularly if from the same party as
the president, a virtual veto over the nomination) was respected
even at the level of a Supreme Court appointment.
The tightly structured, less partisan Senate of the twentieth
century, in which reciprocity, courtesy and deference to leadership
confined behavior no doubt enhanced the likelihood of a victorious
nominee to the Court. To a significant degree, successful presidential strategy often consisted of the cultivation of a few key senators
with the unquestioned ability to deliver the votes of their colleagues.
Lyndon Johnson, for example, often spoke of a Senate consisting of
a few "whales" and many "minnows."24 In any battle within the
Senate, particularly in securing its advice and consent on appointments, the president needed only to negotiate with the appropriate
"whales." The extensive resources ofthe executive branch could be
employed to cultivate important votes without public scrutiny or
participation. In the highly structured world of the Senate at midtwentieth-century, few senators would challenge the leadership.
For the typical senator of this era, an appointment, even to the
Supreme Court, was rarely critical to the interests of constituents
and failure to support the leadership could have an adverse impact
on the ability to achieve other goals.
Lyndon Johnson's failure to secure Senate approval for the
Fortas nomination in 1968 marked the end of the era of presidential
control of the judicial selection process. By the late 1960s a break23. Abraham, Justices and Presidents at 40 (cited in note 1).
24. Bruce Allen Murphy, Fonas: The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Coun Justice 276
(W. Morrow, 1988) ("Fonas").
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down in party leadership and the traditional norms of the Senate
produced a new Senate populated by younger, more independent
senators, compelled by a shrinking electorate to serve the particularized needs of powerful constituency groups.2s Procedural reforms introduced earlier in the century-before 1929, for example,
the Senate met in closed session to consider judicial nominees and it
was not until 1939 that the practice of calling nominees to appear
before the Senate judiciary committee began26.-would merge with
changes in the "folkways" and the politics of the Senate to alter
significantly the politics of judicial nominations.
The most basic change was that of membership. Between 1958
and 1965, twenty-three additional northern Democratic members
entered the Senate. Decidedly more liberal than their elder colleagues--and less electorally secure--the career and policy goals of
these senators were not necessarily advanced by compliance with
Senate norms. Frustration with the traditional ways of the Senate
coupled with sharpened ideological disputes between northern and
southern members made the Senate of the early 1960s a contentious
place. Unwilling to conform to the old model of apprenticeship, the
new members demanded greater participation in the policy process.
Floor activity increased as the northern newcomers often used this
forum to pursue legislative goals.21 The new membership successfully campaigned to increase the number of subcommittees and, in
effect, guarantee junior senators greater responsibility and authority. The push by new members for increased influence within the
institution culminated in the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970, which furthered the trend toward redistribution of power by
restraining the power of committee chairs and limiting each member of the Senate to service on no more than one prestigious
committee.
Even more important than the structural changes that empowered junior members at the expense of their more senior colleagues
was the erosion of the old norms of institutional behavior and the
development of a new Senate style.2s A younger, more volatile electorate, the growth of powerful interest groups, and the influence of
mass media produced a new type of senator. The highly visible
25. The best description of this appears in Sinclair, Transformation (cited in note 19).
26. See, Paul Freund, Appointment of Justices: Some Historical Perspectives, 101 Harv.
L. Rev. 1146 (1988). Until 1929, a two thirds vote of the Senate was required to open the
Senate debate to public scrutiny.
27. Barbara Sinclair also attributes a good deal of this increased floor activity to conservative reaction to the activism of the new membership. See, Sinclair, Transformation at
43-44 (cited in note 19).
28. See, Sinclair, Transformation at Ch. 6 (cited in note 19).
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generalist replaced the behind-the-scenes specialist. No longer did a
senator's committee assignment define the range of interests and influence. The rising costs of reelection campaigns encouraged senators to attract out-of-state campaign contributions by expanding,
rather than narrowing, their scope of activities. The modern senator seeks national media exposure because power and influence is no
longer simply a product of seniority coupled with the respect and
admiration of one's peers but can be achieved outside the institution
by becoming a highly visible spokesperson on a range of important
national issues.
One result is that while committees remain the critical arena of
legislative activity, floor activity has increased, allowing senators,
regardless of seniority or committee assignment, to participate actively in the policymaking process. The growth in staff personnel
has permitted senators to engage in the more public and visible aspects of their work while the mundane, routine legislative work is
delegated. The 1960s also witnessed the passing of the norm of apprenticeship; by the 1970s first term senators arrived with a full legislative agenda and the expectation, and resources, to play a major
role in the legislative process. The folkways of the older Senate precluded individual senators from exercising their prerogative to interfere with the day-to-day operations of the institution; in the more
fluid, less constrained world of the modern Senate, members are far
more willing to use the rules of the Senate to further personal or
policy goals and even the most junior member is likely to engage in
filibuster and extended debate. The consequence is a Senate made
up of powerful, independent contractors in terms of their careers
both as legislators and as candidates.
The implications of these changes for the president's ability to
successfully control nominations to the Court are enormous. The
explicit division of labor of the Senate of the 1950s coupled with the
disproportionate distribution of resources based on seniority ensured that the number of influential and consequential senators on
any particular issue would be quite small. For the most part, leadership was able to deliver votes and presidential courtship of key
votes typically produced a sufficient majority to ensure a successful
appointment to the Court. Thus one leading student of the appointment of federal judges noted that the defeat of John J. Parker in
1930 was not due solely to the documented opposition of the
NAACP and the AFL but also because President Hoover simply
was unable to control influential senators within his own party.29
The 1968 battle over the Fortas nomination signalled an abrupt
29.

See, Abraham, Justices and Presidents at 42 (cited in note 1).
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departure from the old Senate style. Although the Fortas defeat
can be attributed to several factors, Bruce Murphy's definitive biography of Justice Fortas chronicles the significance of the challenge
by a group of young Republicans to the authority of the Republican
minority leader Everett Dirksen.JO President Johnson had secured
Dirksen's pledge of support for Fortas and his promise to deliver
Republican votes; Dirksen's failure to do so not only doomed the
nomination but also testified to the declining influence of Senate
leadership. The battles over Haynesworth and Carswell further evidenced the growing independence of individual senators and the importance of broad, highly visible, national issues to even the most
junior members of the Senate. The Bork nomination battle, fought
for the most part not within the halls of Congress but in the national media, disclosed the extent to which the "whales" no longer
controlled the "minnows." The spectacle of the Thomas nomination was simply the next, albeit giant, step in the evolution of this
process.
By the 1980s, the broad distribution of resources within the
Senate coupled with the extraordinary independence of individual
members presented the president with a far more difficult and complex arena in which to operate. The current Senate is a more open
and effective forum for the expression of diverse interests than was
the case thirty years ago. In and of itself, this fact increases the
likelihood of contentious battles over any presidential nomination.
When these developments are linked to important changes in the
nature of judicial power, however, the unique democratization of
the process of judicial confirmation emerges.
Perhaps it is fitting that the final ingredient in the constellation
of forces that has reshaped the nomination process should emerge
from the efforts of the Warren Court during the 1960s. It was, after
all, the alleged excesses of that Court that powered much of the
Republican rhetoric of that era and led to the unabashed efforts
over the last several administrations to pack the Court with judicial
conservatives. The Warren Court in effect changed the very nature
of judicial power in the United States by redefining the constitutional and discretionary limits on the exercise of federal judicial
power and expanding the range of remedies available to successful
litigants.3I These changes enhanced the ability of the judiciary to
forge linkages with important constituency groups and to serve
30. See, Murphy, Fortas at 299 (cited in note 24).
31. This trend remained unabated during the years of the Burger Court. See e.g., Bernard Schwartz, The Ascent of Pragmatism: The Burger Court in Action Ch. 2 (Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1990).
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these groups in much the same manner as the executive or legislative branch. Because the judiciary has developed the means to serve
new constituencies, the appointment of federal judges is of vital concern to a multitude of powerful and important political interests.32
Considered from this perspective, the real revolution of the
Warren era was to diminish the significance of the limitations on
judicial power contained in Article III as well as the prudential limitations established by an earlier Court which "insure[d] that the
federal courts would not intrude into areas committed to other
branches of government."33 The roots of many of the Warren
Court's most notable achievements-for example, Brown v. Board
of Education 34 and the move to nationalize the Bill of Rights--can
be found in the decisions of the Hughes, Stone and Vinson Courts.
But the Warren Court's almost casual disregard for threshold jurisdictional and justiciability issues stands in stark contrast to the
work of its predecessors. The examples are legion. In Baker v.
Carr 3s the Court swept away the constraints of the political question doctrine to confront the reapportionment controversy despite
relatively recent precedent to the contrary.36 The abstention doctrine-articulated most forcefully by Justice Frankfurter in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. 37-provides that a federal court
should decline to exercise jurisdiction when a constitutional issue
rests on unsettled state law. During the Warren era, however, the
abstention doctrine fell into disuse in the haste to secure federal
court adjudication of important constitutional rights.3s During this
era the rules governing standing to sue,39 mootness,40 and federalstate comity,4t all designed to limit the exercise of federal judicial
power, were relaxed as the Warren Court strove to expand judicial
power to its constitutional limit.
The willingness of the Court to disregard the prudential limits
on judicial power altered the very nature of the federal judiciary.
The freedom from a cramped view of its powers under Article III
coupled with almost complete control over its own docket gave the
Court the opportunity to compete for constituency support. This is
32. Much of this analysis is drawn from Mark Silverstein & Benjamin Ginsberg, The
Supreme Coun and the New Politics of Judicial Power, 102 Pol. Sci. Q. 371 (1987).
33. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95 (1968).
34. 347 u.s. 483 (1954).
35. 369 u.s. 186 (1962).
36. See e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
37. 312 u.s. 496 (1940).
38. See e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfsiter, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
39. See Flast, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
40. See Winz v. Glass Bottle Blowers Ass. Local153, 389 U.S. 463 (1968).
41. See Dombrowski, 380 U.S. 479.
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particularly the case in view of the expansion of judicial remedies
that took place at the same time. Many commentators have noted
the extent to which the judicial decrees of this era required detailed,
specific and often affirmative actions on the part of losing parties. 42
The trend continues, producing a federal judiciary with the power
to detail the manner in which other governmental units will conduct their business and to provide successful litigants with remedies
similar to those previously available only through the executive or
legislative branches.
Scholars have long recognized that groups unable to compete
in the legislative or executive arena often tum to the courts for access to government power.4J This "out-group" notion of interest
litigation, however, fails to appreciate the extent to which the Warren Court altered the very nature of the federal judiciary's relationship to the body politic.44 Relaxing the justiciability standards and
expanding both the limits of class action4s and the range of remedies available to group litigants benefited not only the poor and the
weak but many more affluent, upper-middle class interests. By the
late 1960s, an assortment of these interests--environmentalists,
feminists, consumer groups-found the judiciary to be an important
ally in the battle to secure their goals. For example, the development of a substantial body of consumer and environmental protection law during the last three decades could not have taken place
without an activist judiciary sympathetic to the litigation of claims
in federal courts. Thirty years ago the groups seeking access to the
federal courts may well have been predominantly the politically impotent; today, however, the liberalized limits on judicial power
combined with new tools of judicial power have made the judiciary
an attractive ally for a host of powerful constituent groups.
These developments have created a more powerful and independent judiciary principally because they armed the judiciary
with important political support to fight the battles with congressional and executive branch opponents. The New Deal generation
of liberals, for example, was apprehensive of a judiciary that con42. See, e.g., Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social Policy (Brookings Institution,
1970); Abraham Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Interest Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1281 (1976).
43. See Richard Cortner, Strategies and Tactics of Litigation in Constitutional Cases, 17
J. of Pub. Law 287 (1968).
44. For an interesting essay on the limitations of the "out-group" theory of interest
group judicial activity, see Susan Olson, Interest Group Litigation in Federal District Court:
Beyond the Political Disadvantage Theory, 52 J. of Pol. 854-82 (1990).
45. In 1966, for example, the Supreme Court amended Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to facilitate class actions. The significance of allowing claims that would be
de minimis if asserted individually to be aggregated to group litigation can not be overstated.
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stantly injected itself into the affairs of state without the political
muscle to survive the inevitable political counter-attack.46 The
modern judiciary, however, has greater resources both to shape
public policy and to serve constituencies and, as a result, greater
ability to fight such political battles. For example, the efforts to
limit the power of the federal courts by groups opposed to busing or
limitations on school prayer have been countered by a broad coalition of interests that support an active judiciary.47 Many groups
opposing Judge Bork's elevation to the Supreme Court did so precisely because of his cramped understanding of the role of the modern federal judiciary. A letter, authored by the general counsel of
the Audubon Society and delivered to the members of the Senate
Judiciary Committee, asserting that Judge Bork's rulings in standing to sue cases would limit the ability of environmental groups to
seek federal judicial relief typifies this development. 48 Similar fears
motivated a wide range of groups that saw in Bork a substantial
threat to their interest in an active and dynamic federal judicial system. The same, of course, can be said for Clarence Thomas.
During the last two decades powerful groups have found the
federal courts to be a valuable institutional ally. Limiting the constraints on the access to the federal courts has opened the doors of
the federal judiciary to an ever-widening array of interests. Innovation in the nature and scope of the decrees issued by these courts
has vastly increased the ability of the judiciary to serve these interests. The political implication of these developments is that potent
political forces will fight to ensure that the judiciary continues to
play an activist role in the development and implementation of national policy.
CONCLUSION
In the months following his failed appointment to the Supreme
Court, Robert Bork toured the country. Speaking before various
conservative and business groups, he asserted that his defeat was the
product of the "first all-out political campaign with respect to a ju46. This is precisely why judicial liberals in the mold of Felix Frankfurter and Louis
Brandeis placed such emphasis on the notion of justiciability; it permitted the judiciary to
avoid battles it could not win without sanctioning results it found distasteful. The best expression of this notion of judicial liberalism appears in Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Yale U. Press, 1986).
47. Examples are detailed in Silverstein and Ginsberg, 102 Pol. Sci. Q. at 385-87 (cited
in note 32).
48. Described in Michael Pertshuk and Wendy Schaetzel, The People Rising: The Campaign Against the Bork Nomination 184 (Thunder's Mouth Press, 1989).
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dicial nominee in the country's history."49 Aside from the self-serving nature of much of his analysis, so Bork almost had it correct: the
campaign to defeat him was an intensely political effort aimed at
denying an outspoken critic of modern judicial activism a seat on
the United States Supreme Court. Such an event, however, cannot
be explained as simply a reaction to Bork and his jurisprudence; his
defeat was merely an important step in a new confirmation system
that has evolved over the last several decades.
The demise of the Roosevelt coalition as the governing regime
in post-New Deal America created a Democratic party split between the declining blue collar ethnic wing and an emerging elite
wing with a dramatic focus on middle class lifestyle issues. To this
elite wing of the Democratic party, the judiciary has been an important agent in securing and protecting many policy gains of the last
three decades. Not surprisingly, increased reliance on the judiciary
by elements of the Democratic party produced a counterreaction
among important forces within the Republican party resulting in
added scrutiny of the judiciary by powerful elements within both
parties. Changes in the institutional folkways and rules of the Senate have made individual senators far more sensitive to the demands
of group interests while also diminishing the ability of the leadership to present a united position on many issues. With power
spread more broadly throughout the Senate and with many senators
seeking visible, national issues to champion, conflicts over nominees
to the federal bench, particularly the Supreme Court, are certain to
arise. The changes in judicial power and the ability of the courts to
serve the needs of powerful and important political groups virtually
guarantee that these battles will be well financed and highly visible.
The modern confirmation process that emerges resembles a
continuing cat and mouse game between the Senate and the executive. The president, upon naming a candidate with an acceptable
"conservative" judicial philosophy, mounts a campaign to outflank
the inevitable opposition. Foes of the nominee in the Senate unite
to devise a strategy which will focus attention on the threat posed
by the candidate to an activist judiciary. An obvious consequence is
that the stature of the candidate becomes, at best, a secondary con49. Quoted in Ethan Bonner, Battle for Justice: How the Bark Nomination Shook
America 341 (W. W. Norton, 1989).
50. Judge Bork does not to hesitate to characterize his defeat as the result of liberal
elites' self-interested refusal to accept his disinterested, faithful-to-the-Framers interpretation
of the Constitution and the role of the federal judiciary. Portraying the battle as essentially
one between evil and good may serve to rally the faithful but has nothing to do with political
reality. See Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of America (Collier Macmillan, 1990).
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sideration. President Reagan undercut potential opposition to his
initial nominee by naming the first woman to the Court; the fact
that Sandra Day O'Connor presented a somewhat sparse resume for
a potential Supreme Court Justice was lost in the general euphoria
that a woman had finally been named to the Court. The White
House responded to the Bork defeat by seeking less controversial
and well-known candidates. In the bizarre world of modern confirmations, the mediocre record of Judge Souter was considered an
important asset by the Bush Administration. Armed with a strategy of refusing to engage the Senate Judiciary Committee in any
meaningful discussion of his judicial philosophy and a quaint, ascetic demeanor, Souter won easy confirmation. Liberals in the Senate reacted to the reality of Justice Souter on the Supreme Court by
vowing to deny confirmation in the future to any nominee who refused to respond to the committee's inquiries. Flushed with the
success of disengagement, however, the Bush White House continued the strategy but sought to undercut potential opposition by
nominating Clarence Thomas, whose race and Horatio Alger life
story diverted attention from his marginal professional
qualifications.
The lesson of history is that service on the Court may transform individuals of limited stature or parochial background into giants of American law and politics. Notwithstanding the possibility
of growth and development on the Court, however, the inescapable
conclusion is that in the immediate future we are unlikely to see
nominees with the stature of a Felix Frankfurter or the legendary
experience and background of a Thurgood Marshall. These men
ascended to the Court the product of a highly static process controlled by political and legal elites. The system of confirmation today is a far more democratic process, shaped by extraordinary
public participation and media coverage. That, of course, is the decided teaching of the Clarence Thomas proceedings. Thirty years
ago sexual harassment was generally unacknowledged as a wrong;
equally significant, in comprehending the events of the Thomas confirmation, however, is the fact that thirty years ago there were few
organized women's groups and they had limited political impact.
Moreover, women had little impetus for careful scrutiny of Court
appointments. Today, women are not only politically organized but
many consider appointments to the Court critical to the realization
of policy goals. The obvious confusion and discomfort of many
Senators as the Senate virtually imploded during the firestorm of
the Thomas nomination is powerful testimony to the fact that the
confirmation process is no longer within the control of traditional
leadership elites.
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It is within the often unseemly clash of opposing interests that
the modern liberal-democratic state seeks to achieve rough consensus on its most pressing and divisive issues. Given the developments of the last several decades, it should not be surprising that
this struggle now defines the selection of our judges. From this perspective, the cries to depoliticize the process are not only naive but,
perhaps, too hastily considered. The apparent decorum of the past
was achieved at the expense of participation and accountability.
Few who viewed the agony and personal tragedies of the Clarence
Thomas proceedings can avoid the almost instinctive desire to return to less visible and contentious proceedings, but the stakes are
too high and involve the vital interests of too many forces to seek
refuge in the ways of the past.

